OJBM  Vol.3 No.4 , October 2015
Family Involvement and Firm Governance: In the View of Socioemotional Wealth Protection
ABSTRACT
Family business is one of the things in the past, also is the existing way, the model of the future. Based on the 1420 private companies listed in China for 7 years (2006-2012), data statistical analysis found that with the increasing of the year, two rights separation degree of private enterprises were falling. As the change of the institutional environment, involved in the enterprise internal members of the family are increasing, and the source is also diversified. Listed on the mainland China for 717 family enterprises 7 years (2006-2012), the data of empirical test showed that the family members involved in the enterprise are advantageous to the family firm social emotional wealth preservation; the relationship of core family and family enterprise social emotional wealth behavior had a direct relationship. The improvement of the external institutional environment also be advantageous to the family enterprise social emotional wealth preservation, and the external environment will also be able to change influence of the family members involved in the enterprise to family enterprise social emotional wealth preservation behavior. The outbreak of the financial crisis eases the contradiction between the members of the family and the common crisis awareness, which shows the relationship between brothers and relatives and friends with the core family relationship (marriage) family members for the preservation of the family enterprise social emotional wealth which make greater contribution than the second direct generation.

Cite this paper
Yuan, Z. , Han, X. and Zheng, Y. (2015) Family Involvement and Firm Governance: In the View of Socioemotional Wealth Protection. Open Journal of Business and Management, 3, 453-464. doi: 10.4236/ojbm.2015.34046.
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